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Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: 
Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era
GUY PESSACH*
Critical copyright scholarship rightly emphasizes the social costs of ordering cultural 
production through proprietary intellectual property law regimes. This scholarship also 
celebrates the virtues of free content and free access, particularly in digital domains. The 
purpose of this article is to question this critique, which tends to pair proprietary intellectual 
property protection with informational capitalism and the commodification of culture. This 
article argues that the drawbacks of cultural commodification and informational capitalism 
are also apparent in market-oriented media environments that are based on free distribution 
of content. The article makes a novel contribution by untying the seemingly Gordian knot 
binding proprietary IP to capitalist structures of corporate media. Media environments based 
on free distribution of content are no less vulnerable to market powers. This analysis has 
significant normative implications for the desirability of contemporary approaches that 
advocate mobilization towards non-proprietary “beyond IP” legal regimes.
Les travaux critiques d’érudition sur le droit d’auteur insistent avec raison sur les coûts 
sociaux liés au fait de régir la production culturelle par le biais du droit de la propriété 
intellectuelle. Ces travaux vantent également les mérites du libre contenu et du libre 
accès, particulièrement dans l’univers numérique. L’objectif de cet article est de remettre 
en question cette critique qui cherche à associer la protection de la propriété intellectuelle 
avec le capitalisme de l’information et la marchandisation de la culture. Cet article fait valoir 
que les inconvénients du capitalisme de l’information et de la marchandisation de la culture 
se retrouvent également dans l’univers médiatique axé sur le marché fondé sur la libre 
distribution des contenus. Il crée un apport novateur en tranchant le nœud gordien qui semble 
relier la propriété intellectuelle à la structure capitaliste des médias corporatifs. L’univers 
* Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Affiliate Fellow, Information Society 
Project, Yale Law School. A prior draft of this essay was presented at the McGill University 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy (CIPP). I am indebted to Professor Pierre-Emmanuel 
Moyse the director of the CIPP for hosting me and for excellent insights on the topic of this 
paper. This research was supported by the Barak Center for Interdisciplinary Legal Research 
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des médias fondé sur la libre distribution des contenus n’en est pas moins vulnérable aux 
forces du marché. Cette analyse possède d’importantes implications normatives sur la 
souhaitabilité de l’approche contemporaine qui préconise une mobilisation envers un régime 
légal « au-delà de la propriété intellectuelle ».
IN THE PAST TWO decades, legal scholars have written extensively about the 
political economy of corporate media and the manner in which copyright 
protection and proprietary control over creative works negatively affect such goals 
and values as autonomy, self-fulfillment, creative freedom, political capability, 
and cultural diversity.1
1. See e.g. Brett M Frischmann, “Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law” (2007) 
3:3 Rev L & Econ 649 (questioning the efficiency of IP and copyright law in particular as a 
mechanism for regulating cultural production); Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain” (1999) 74 NYU L 
Rev 354 [Benkler, “Free as the Air”] (explaining copyright’s constraints on free speech and 
democratic public discourse); Yochai Benkler, “Intellectual Property and the Organization of 
Information Production” (2002) 22 Int’l Rev L & Econ 81 [Benkler, “Intellectual Property 
and the Organization of Information Production”] (arguing that legal ordering of cultural 
production through intellectual property regimes tends to enclose and narrow cultural 
production to homogenous commercially viable creative works); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
“Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression” (2000) 53:6 Vand L 
Rev 1897 [Netanel, “Market Hierarchy”] (discussing the linkage between IP regimes and the 
concentration of media markets, and demonstrating how copyright law establishes “speech 
hierarchies” between, on the one hand, individuals and non-commercialized entities, and, 
on the other hand, media conglomerates, while inflicting unequal capacities to participate in 
speech activities and the democratic discourse); Margaret Chon, “Intellectual Property and 
the Development Divide” (2006) 27:6 Cardozo L Rev 2821 (discussing the conflict between 
IP law and distributive justice); Amy Kapczynski, “The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get 
Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism” (2012) 59 UCLA L Rev 970 [Kapczynski, “The 
Cost of Price”] (arguing that IP regimes bear costs not only in terms of efficiency but also 
in terms of distributive justice and informational privacy); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, 
“Distributive Values in Copyright” (2005) 83 Tex L Rev 1535 at 1562-1566 (describing the 
ways in which current copyright schemes conflict with distributive values); Margaret Chon, 
“Intellectual Property from Below: Copyright and Capability for Education” (2007) 40 UC 
Davis L Rev 803 (discussing copyright’s burdens on distributive values and human capacities, 
particularly in the context of the right to education); Madhavi Sunder, “IP3” (2006) 59 
Stan L Rev 257 (explaining and demonstrating the limits of current copyright schemes in 
supporting and enhancing individual creativity).
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The basic argument of critical copyright scholarship is that the political 
economy of informational capitalism is largely based upon the commodification 
of informational and creative resources. Owners utilize these private entitlements 
in ways that maximize profits but at the same time impair the public interest and 
democratic values attached to speech, communication, and cultural activities.2 
As a result, the commodification of culture through proprietary entitlements and 
private control raises concerns from a democratic point of view.3
Critical copyright scholarship also emphasizes the copyright’s role in 
shaping the political economy of corporate media.4 Control over the means of 
production and distribution is gained through a mixture of government-issued 
entitlements in creative resources (e.g., copyright) and distribution platforms 
(e.g., telecommunications licenses).5 Within this framework, the traditional 
corporate media model is based on producer-consumer relationships and the 
copyrighting of culture—that is, the commodification of content through 
proprietary protection.6 This economic model pivots around the extraction of 
revenue from the distribution of and provision of access to content.7 At the same 
time, a market-oriented media system fails to provide the public with the whole 
array of media products that the society desires.8 Media markets tend to produce 
a wasteful abundance of content that responds to mainstream tastes while 
neglecting civically, educationally, and culturally pluralistic content.9 Additionally, 
2. Ibid; See also Guy Pessach, “Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing 
Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Externalities” (2003) 76 S Cal L Rev 
1067 at 1076-1081, 1087-1097 [Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing Restriction”].
3. See generally Ronald V Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property (Michigan: Westview Press, 1996) at 79-103.
4. See Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation 
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access” (2000) 52 Fed Comm LJ 561 at 562 
[Benkler, “From Consumers to Users”] (describing the manner in which telecommunications 
law and intellectual property law allocate entitlements in creative resources and physical 
distributions platforms).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid; See also Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing Restriction,” supra note 2 at 1076-1081, 
1087-1092, nn 41-44.
7. See generally Harold L Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial 
Analysis, 8th ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pessach, “Copyright as a 
Silencing Restriction” supra note 2; Bettig, supra note 3 at 79-103 (Indeed, the traditional 
corporate media model is also highly dependent upon advertisement revenue. Nevertheless, 
extracting direct revenues from distributing and selling content was and still is a pivotal 
source of income for traditional corporate media).
8. See C Edwin Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) at 1-96 [Baker, “Media, Markets and Democracy”].
9. Ibid.
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the nature of corporate media as advertising-supported favours media products 
that have a wide appeal and are suitable for selling the advertised products over 
media that attends to the diversity of people’s actual needs and interests.10
The emergence of the Internet is perceived by critical copyright scholars as a 
unique opportunity to significantly improve society’s informational and cultural 
ecology, if only the right regulatory and legal choices are made.11 In broad strokes, 
the argument is that new information technologies make it easier for individuals, 
groups and communities to collaborate in producing and exchanging cultural 
content, knowledge, and other information goods without requiring the 
involvement of commercial, profit-motivated media entities.12 New, cheaper 
methods of producing, storing, and distributing content provide fertile ground 
10. Ibid at 24-30, 182-183.
11. See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) [Benkler, “The Wealth 
of Networks”] (using economic, political and technological analyses to explain how new 
information technologies make it easier for individuals to collaborate in producing cultural 
content, knowledge and other information goods without requiring monetary incentives, 
and thus calling to reduce the manner in which copyright law and telecommunications 
law protect and advance the interests of producers and corporate media); Lawrence Lessig, 
Remix: Making Art And Commerce Thrive In The Hybrid Economy (London: The Penguin 
Press, 2008) [Lessig, “Remix”] (describing the prospects and creative potential of networked 
communication platforms as well as the constraints imposed by IP laws); William W. Fisher 
III, Promises To Keep; Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004) at 199-259 (offering compulsory licensing schemes that legalize 
online content engagements, including file-sharing, among other purposes, in order to realize 
the prospects of digitization while mitigating content owners’ dominance and control over 
distribution channels); Jack M Balkin, “Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory 
of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society” (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 1 (arguing 
that: (a) digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech while making possible 
widespread cultural participation and interactions that previously could not have existed on 
the same scale; and (b) copyright law and telecommunications law impose both restrictions 
and private ordering regimes of exclusivity that conflict with and restrict the prospects of 
digitization); Jessica Litman, “Real Copyright Reform” (2010) 96 Iowa L Rev 1 at 12, 28, 
30, 35 (describing how the economics of digital distribution now make it possible to engage 
in mass dissemination without significant capital investment; and second, the fact that the 
current, modest share of copyright that creators (as opposed to distributors) enjoy suffices to 
inspire continued authorship. According to Litman, the accumulation of these two elements 
seems to leave little justification for continuing a distributor-centric copyright system which 
poorly serves both users and creators. Litman, therefore, calls for a significant reduction in 
the proprietary copyright protection of intermediaries and distributors, and therefore, their 
incentives to engage in the creative industries).
12. Ibid.
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for the emergence—and constant demonstration of the existence—of enhanced 
schemes for sustaining culture and knowledge beyond IP.13
From this perspective, the traditional distributor-centric, proprietary-based 
cultural and informational industries appear both unjustified and counterproductive 
in terms of the public interest in cultural diversity, decentralization of media 
spheres, and individuals’ self-fulfillment. It seems only natural that a shift from 
producer-consumer cultural industries to civically engaged cultural spheres 
would be feasible, if one could only dissolve the strong attachment of cultural 
production to intellectual property protection as a governing institution.14
Critical copyright scholarship does not stop at criticizing the traditional 
corporate media model, it also offers an alternative model of creative activities 
that rests upon concepts of free content, free access, and openness.15 This 
scholarship shows that there is much to be looked for beyond intellectual 
property, particularly in light of persuasive evidence and arguments that authors’ 
13. See Balkin, supra note 11 at 6-12 (arguing that digital technologies alter the social conditions 
of speech while making possible widespread cultural participation and interactions that 
previously could not have existed on the same scale. Balkin also emphasizes the fact that 
the digital revolution has: (1) drastically lowered the costs of copying and distributing 
information; (2) made it easier for content to cross cultural and geographical borders; and (3) 
lowered the costs of transmission, distribution, appropriation, and alteration of content while 
commenting and building upon it.) Litman, supra note 11 at 1, 12, 28, 30, 35 (discussing 
the ways in which digitization and networked communication technologies significantly 
reduce the costs of producing, storing and distributing content and cultural products).
14. For a survey of such approaches see Guy Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation – A 
Skeptical Copyright Perspective” (2013) 33 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 833 at 835-38 [Pessach, 
“Deconstructing Disintermediation”].
15. See Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 (arguing and demonstrating how digital technologies 
provide tools for a “Read/Write” culture in which users and consumers take an active role 
in cultural production for non-profit-motivated reasons. This in turn leads to cultural 
and creative spheres in which models of sharing economy and hybrid economies flourish, 
particularly if legal [de]regulation reduces the scope, scale and intensity of copyright 
protection); Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of A Radical Price (New York: Hyperion, 
2009) [Anderson, “Free”] (examining the rise of business models which give products and 
services to customers for free, often as a strategy for attracting users and relying upon other 
sources of revenues); Yochai Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the 
Firm” (2002) 112 Yale LJ 369 [Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin”] (exploring and demonstrating 
the virtues of commons based peer production in a networked environment); Anupam 
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” 
Fan Fiction as Fair Use” (2007) 95:2 Calif L Rev 597; Dan Hunter & F Gregory Lastowka, 
“Amateur-to-Amateur” (2004) 46 WM & Mary L Rev 951 (elaborating on the rising role of 
amateur culture in networked environments).
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and creators’ incentives are far more diverse than intellectual property’s direct 
economic incentive.16
The purpose of this article is to untie the seemingly Gordian knot between 
proprietary intellectual property protection and capitalist structures of corporate 
media. I argue that media environments based on free distribution of content are 
no less vulnerable to corporate market powers.17 Free content and departure from 
traditional proprietary intellectual property regimes do not necessarily lead to 
true, effective freedom for individuals.
Recent scholarship in the areas of communications studies and critical 
Internet studies examines the emergence of a new political economy in which 
networked information industries are built upon free flow of information 
and content.18 This literature describes what many of us experience on a daily 
basis: a highly concentrated industry in which revenues are extracted mostly 
from selling advertisements and users’ personal data.19 The scholarship focuses 
on informational capitalism, which uses data, information and content as 
means of production and circulation to make profit and accumulate wealth.20 
16. See Rebecca Tushnet, “Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions” 
(2009) 51 WM & Mary L Rev 513 at 523-27; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Copyrights as 
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?” (2011) 12 Theor Inq L 29 (presenting findings and 
arguments that authors’ and creators’ incentives deviate from copyright’s direct economic 
incentive); Eric E Johnson, “Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy” (2012) 39 
Fla St UL Rev 623; Karl Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How 
Imitation Sparks Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) (discussing the 
empirical question of whether IP incentives matter for innovation); Benkler, “The Wealth 
Of Networks”, supra note 11 (arguing that the technological, communicative and social 
conditions of digital communication networks stimulate and facilitate civic-engaged 
not-for-profit knowledge and cultural production activities).
17. See Part I below.
18. See Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013); Evgeny 
Morozov, To Save Everything Click Here: The Folly Of Technological Solutionism (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2013); Astra Taylor, The People’s Platform: Taking Back Power And Culture 
In The Digitial Age (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2014); Robert W McChesney, Digital 
Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning The Internet Against Democracy (New York: The 
New Press, 2013); James Curran, Natalie Fenton & Des Freedman, Misunderstanding the 
Internet (Oxford: Routledge, 2012); Christian Fuchs, Internet and Society: Social Theory in the 
Information Age (New York: Routledge, 2008).
19. See also Peter Menell, “Brand Totalitarianism” (2014) 47 UC Davis L Rev 787 at 805; Julie 
E Cohen, “What is Privacy For?” (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 1904 at 1915-17; Morozov, supra 
note 18 at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 349-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran, 
Fenton & Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84.
20. See Fuchs, supra note 18 at 99 (defining informational capitalism and discussing different 
approaches to informational capitalism).
PESSACH,  BEYOND IP—THE COST OF FREE 231
The key features of this networked environment include a strong tendency 
towards selling “eyeballs” (audience attention) to advertisers;21 utilization 
of big data;22 and the use of information flows about consumer behaviour to 
target advertisements, search results, and other content.23 Similar such features 
include stealth advertisement; sophisticated systems of predictive analytics;24 
commodification of consumers’ data;25 and free utilization of content.26 These 
features represent a brave new world that is the opposite of what one anticipates 
when looking beyond intellectual property protection. In such “beyond IP” 
realms, industrialized corporate structures, media concentration, content biases, 
abridged creative diversity, and deflated authorial welfare may outweigh the 
drawbacks of traditional corporate media.27
A second, related aspect of informational capitalism is its growing 
dependence on free content and information as elementary means of production. 
In a political economy that does not extract revenues through the direct 
commercialization and sale of content, but rather from the commercialization of 
personal information and users’ attention, free content and free information are 
the main bait for obtaining and monetizing both audience attention and users’ 
personal information.
21. See Part I below.
22. See Part I below. See also Lanier, supra note 18 (critically analyzing the downsides of a 
networked economy in which users give away valuable information about themselves in 
exchange for free online content, products and services; at the same time online firms 
accrue large amounts of data—leading to concentrated wealth and power—at virtually 
no cost); Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015) (critically describing and 
analyzing big data practices and their utilization for leveraging price discrimination practices, 
profits and power).
23. Katherine J Strandburg, “Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect” 
(2013) U Chicago Legal F 95 at 122-32 (surveying different online business models of 
behavioural and contextual advertising that are based on users’ data collection, including 
their online activities, engagements and searchers).
24. See Pasquale, supra note 22 (critically surveying a variety of areas in which predictive analysis 
are being utilized for marketing, price discrimination, and financial gains practices).
25. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, “To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency 
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising” (2012) 13 Minn J L Sci & 
Tech 281 at 335; Giacomo Luchetta, “Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?” 
(Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali, 2012), online: <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2048683>; Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, “Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the 
Harm & Where Are We Heading” (The Progress & Freedom Foundation Progress on Point 
Paper, Vol 16, No 2, 2009), online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1348246>.
26. See Part I below.
27. See Part I, below, for more on this topic.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL232
Spheres beyond intellectual property thus represent a social contradiction 
between their empowering functions and their vulnerability to exploitation and 
commodification. Free flow and distribution of content undoubtedly stimulate 
social conditions that empower individuals, promote innovation, and advance 
cultural democracy. Yet, at the same time, they provide no safeguards against 
patterns that imitate the logic and drivers of proprietary cultural industries. 
In fact, they simultaneously create new opportunities to make profits and 
accumulate property through the commodification and commercialization of 
users’ attention and personal information.
Although the emergence of networked informational capitalism is well 
addressed in the academic literature,28 there is hardly any reference to the linkage 
between networked informational capitalism and components, both legal and 
ideological, that are derived from and associated with free distribution of content 
in cultural and informational zones in which intellectual property’s governance is 
less salient. I argue that informational capitalism is linked not only to elements 
of proprietary control, but also to elements of free flow and non-proprietary 
modes of content circulation. This argument questions the conventional wisdom 
of critical copyright scholarship, which tends to pair proprietary protection with 
informational capitalism and the commodification of culture.29
By making this claim, I am not arguing for the restoration of an expansionist 
and intellectual property-centric approach. I do argue, however, that certain 
segments of free content markets stimulate pressures that go against the values 
of a democratic culture.30 Moreover, I argue that conceptual frames such as “free 
culture” can impair the ability to fully comprehend and respond to the challenges 
imposed by the contemporary industrial economics of freely distributed content.31 
This argument bears significant normative implications because it emphasizes the 
28. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (West 
Sussex: Blackwell, 1996) at 14.
29. For the conventional approach see e.g. Netanel, “Market Hierarchy”, supra note 1; Niva 
Elkin-Koren, “It’s All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information 
Landscape” in Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds, The Commodification of 
Information (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 79 at 105-109; Benkler, “Free as 
the Air” supra note 1; Mark S Nadel, “How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative 
Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing” (2004) 19 Berkeley Tech LJ 785.
30. See Balkin, supra note 11 at 6-12 (presenting and elaborating on the characteristics of a 
democratic culture).
31. See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology And The Law To Lock 
Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) (popularizing the 
term “free culture” as a counter to the common proprietary model of corporate media and 
cultural production).
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limits and fickleness of the call for copyright deregulation as a means to advance 
the public interest. On the contrary, intellectual property may, paradoxically, have 
a role to play in culminating and mitigating informational capitalism. Intellectual 
property may play a dual role in this regard: first, by shifting revenue sources 
and incentives back to the creative content itself (from advertisements and the 
commercialization of users’ personal data),32 and second, by decentralizing the 
market power of networked corporate media platforms.33
Indeed, there is a contradiction between the manner in which intellectual 
property’s control and commodification functions nourish corporate media, 
on one hand,34 and the manner in which intellectual property may counterbalance 
informational capitalism on the other hand.35 The regulatory challenge, therefore, 
is to acknowledge and respond to the fact that the drawbacks of market-oriented 
media environments are based on free distribution of content.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the political economy of 
contemporary markets based on free distribution of content. Part II discusses the 
implications of these findings for copyright policy. Part III concludes.
I. INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM BEYOND IP
Examination of contemporary communicative and cultural spheres reveals that 
creative and informational zones beyond the traditional proprietary corporate 
media model occupy prominent segments of the Internet. Much of people’s 
informational engagements, both as conveyors and as recipients, are conducted 
through frameworks and platforms that rely upon open access to and free flow 
of content.36 Many such activities are stripped of intellectual property regulation. 
Even if intellectual property protection applies to these activities in theory, 
32. Ibid at 288.
33. See also Guy Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation – A Skeptical Copyright 
Perspective” (2013) 33 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 833 at 865-68 [Pessach, “Deconstructing 
Disintermediation”].
34. See Pessach, “Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction”, supra note 2 at 1092, 1077-1081, 
1097 (discussing how in an industrial, corporate-media institutional structure, broad 
and extensive copyright protection tends to support commercialized mass-media 
products and restrict other forms of creative and cultural engagements); See also 
Elkin-Koren, supra note 29.
35. See Part II below.
36. See e.g. Andrson, Free, supra note 15; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11; 
Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11; see also major online platfroms such as YouTube <www.
youtube.com>; Instagram <www.instagram.com>.
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as a practical matter the operative communicative and business models presume 
free distribution of content and information.
Search engines’ retrieval services, the blogosphere, content-sharing platforms, 
certain types of online music services, online newspapers, social networks, instant 
messaging, voice services and many other segments of our informational and 
cultural lives are now “free as the air to common use.”37 Content, information 
and other types of creative output are distributed for free. Resources such as 
photographs, video clips, visual images, game applications, music, and textual 
materials may be formally protected by copyright and other types of intellectual 
property rights,38 yet the economic and communicative schemes through which 
they are produced and exchanged are in many instances schemes of free access and 
free distribution. As a matter of law in action, intellectual property rights do not 
function as a mechanism to govern the production, exchange and distribution of 
such creative materials.
At least to some degree, this shift was less a consequence of well-planned 
ex ante reforms to intellectual property law, and more a consequence of the 
Internet’s unique technological and communicative conditions.39 At the same 
time, legal policy also partially supported the creation and expansion of zones 
that are practically ungoverned by proprietary intellectual property regimes. The 
United States provides several prominent examples in this regard: (a) the broad 
interpretation and application of the fair use defense, including in the context 
37. Benkler, “Free as the Air”, supra note 1.
38. Copyright Act, RSC 198, c C-42, s 5(1). (Copyright’s subject matter covers, among other 
works, literary works, dramatic works, musical works and artistic works).
39. See Anderson, “Free”, supra note 15; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11 
(presenting the theory that networked communication platforms are characterized by the 
attributes of scale, scope and production capacity, which in turn empower non-market 
forms of social production); Balkin, supra note 11 (arguing that digital technologies alter 
the social conditions of cultural and creative engagements while making possible widespread 
cultural participation and interactions that previously could not have existed on the same 
scale). Balkin also emphasizes the fact that the digital revolution has: (1) drastically lowered 
the costs of copying and distributing information; (2) made it easier for content to cross 
cultural and geographical borders; and (3) lowered the costs of transmission, distribution, 
appropriation, and alteration of content while commenting and building upon it); Ibid.
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of search engines’ activities;40 (b) a limited and narrow approach to third party 
liability for contributory copyright infringement;41 (c) the creation of safe harbours 
for content-sharing platforms through notice and takedown procedures;42 and 
(d) the narrow interpretation of the distribution right in digital domains.43 
40. See Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F (3d) 811 (9th Cir 2003) (determining that reproduction 
and public display of thumbnail-sized images of visual materials within the results pages of a 
search engine are considered fair-use); Perfect10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F (3d) 1146 (9th 
Cir 2007) (characterizing a search engine’s display of thumbnail images as fair use under the 
transformative use doctrine); Authors Guild Inc v HathiTrust, 755 F (3d) 87 (2d Cir 2014) 
(determining that the creation of a database of ten million books, of which perhaps up to 
seven million were protected by copyright, using digitized copies of books from research 
library collections, is considered fair-use as long as the database is utilized only as a full-text 
searchable information resource that allows patrons to find books relevant to their research 
projects); Authors Guild v Google Inc, 804 F (3d) 202 (2d Cir 2015) (determining that 
Google’s scanning of millions of books and indexing their contents to serve up some snippets 
in response to user search queries is a transformative fair-use).
41. See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc, 464 US 417 (9th Cir 1984) followed 
by MGM Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd, 545 US 913 (US 2005). Under the Sony decision, 
one who manufactures and distributes a technology will not be liable for infringement 
committed by its users as long as the technology has “substantial non-infringing uses.” The 
Grokster decision, which dealt with the legality of a piece of file-sharing software, added to 
the Sony test a requirement that the maker must not have acted with the intent of inducing 
its users to infringe copyright. Under the Sony decision and the Grokster decision, there is an 
immunity from indirect liability for copyright infringement for technologies that are capable 
of substantial non-infringing uses unless there is inducement to infringe copyright).
42. See 17 USC § 512(c) (2012) [DMCA]; Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, 676 F 
(3d) 19 at para 39 (2d Cir 2012) [Viacom]; UMG Recordings Inc v Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC, 667 F (3d) 1022 (9th Cir 2011) [UMG]; Capitol Records Inc v MP3tunes LLC, 821 F 
Supp (2d) 627 (SDNY 2011) [Capitol]; Io Group Inc v Veoh Networks Inc, 586 F Supp (2d) 
1132 (ND Cal 2008) [Io Group]. See also Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, “Copyright 
Enforcement and Online File Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?” 
(2012) 59:3 J Copyright Soc’y USA 627 at 662. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
enacted in 1998 and codified in Title 17, § 512 of the United States Code, includes four 
main safe harbours for Internet service providers. Section 512(c) provides a safe harbour for 
hosting services providers. Court rulings regarding section 512(c) vary in their nuances, but 
at the end of the day, the general direction of courts is that content sharing platforms also 
benefit from § 512(c)’s safe harbour.
43. See Peter S Menell, “In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute 
in the Internet Age” (2011) 59:1 J Copyright Soc’y USA 201 (surveying and critically 
analyzing the interpretation of the exclusive right of distribution (17 USCS § 106(3) in 
digital contexts). As Menell demonstrates, the courts’ inclination was to adopt a narrow 
interpretation of the distribution right, which does not apply the distribution right in digital 
contexts. See also Capitol Records Inc v Thomas, 579 F Supp (2d) 1210 (D Minn 2008) 
(concluding that the distribution right applies only with regard to the distribution of copies 
of a copyrighted work and not their making available digitally).
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These are all examples of a US legal policy that facilitated and legitimized 
large-scale networked activities beyond the reach of intellectual property’s 
proprietary control, affecting even profit-motivated corporate media activity.44
The Canadian legal situation seems less clear and homogenous in this regard. 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly acknowledged the status 
of users’ rights in copyright law, this acknowledgment has not resulted in further 
judicial decisions to parallel the United States approach of narrowing copyright 
owners’ proprietary control.45 Indeed, in what is known as the “Copyright 
Pentalogy,” the Supreme Court of Canada issued, in one day, five copyright 
decisions, all of which represent a public-regarding approach towards copyright 
law.46 None of these decisions, however, indicates either explicit or implicit 
support for the establishment of contemporary networked media environments 
(as the aforementioned US court decisions indicate).
In its earlier SOCAN decision—which was not a part of the Copyright 
Pentology—the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide the legality of 
Internet service providers’ caching of music files.47 In its decision, the Court 
explicitly protected the ability of Internet service providers to deploy innovative 
44. See sources cited supra notes 40-43 (most of the cases cited involved large-scale profit 
motivated corporate entities such as Google, YouTube (owned by Google) and Amazon, 
which have successfully sheltered themselves within IP’s negative spaces).
45. CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339, 236 DLR (4th) 395.
46. Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 2 SCR 
345, 347 DLR (4th) 287; Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231; Rogers Communications 
Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 
SCR 283; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 
SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 326; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 
SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376. For a further discussion of these cases see Michael Geist, The 
Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian 
Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013).
47. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet 
Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427.
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technologies such as caching to improve Internet efficiency.48 In BMG Canada Inc 
v John Doe, the Federal Court determined that downloading a song for personal 
use falls within the private copying exemption in subsection 80(1) of the Copyright 
Act.49 The Court stated that uploading a musical file through a peer-to-peer 
file-sharing platform does not constitute infringement either. On appeal, the 
Federal Court of Appeal, declined to rule whether copyright infringement indeed 
took place. Notwithstanding this refusal, the appellate decision still included 
several remarks to support the conclusion that both downloading and uploading 
of copyrighted files through a peer-to-peer file-sharing network might constitute 
copyright infringements. For one, the Court of Appeal questioned whether 
peer-to-peer file sharing indeed involves reproduction on an “audio recording 
medium” and therefore could be sheltered under the exemption for private 
copying. In addition, the Court of Appeal questioned whether, in the context of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing, the act of private copying is done “for the purposes of 
distribution” and would therefore fall outside the exemption for private copying. 
Lastly, the Court of Appeal doubted the lower court’s interpretation of the terms 
“authorization” and “distribution” while raising the possibility that these terms 
are broad enough to capture actions that make copyright-protected materials 
available for downloading through peer-to-peer networks. Altogether, the BMG 
Canada Inc v John Doe affair cannot be classified as a decision that leans towards 
the creation and expansion of zones that are practically ungoverned by proprietary 
intellectual property regimes.
Together with the unique attributes of networked communication 
platforms,50 legal policies to expand zones ungoverned by proprietary intellectual 
48. More specifically, Internet service providers were privileged from liability for copyright 
infringement under section 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, which exempts from liability a 
“person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter 
to the public consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for another 
person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter” at para 27. In deciding so, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the “public interest in encouraging intermediaries who make 
telecommunications possible to expand and improve their operations without the threat of 
copyright infringement” at para 114. The court added that “to impose copyright liability on 
intermediaries would obviously chill that expansion and development” (para 114) and that 
“the creation of a “cache” copy, after all, is a serendipitous consequence of improvements 
in Internet technology, is content neutral, and…ought not to have any legal bearing on the 
communication between the content provider and the end user” (para 115). “Caching” the 
court added, “is dictated by the need to deliver faster and more economic service, and should 
not, when undertaken only for such technical reasons, attract copyright liability” (para 116).
49. See BMG Canada Inc v John Doe, 2004 FC 488, [2004] 3 FCR 241, aff’d in part 2005 FCA 
193, [2005] 4 FCR 81.
50. See supra notes 11, 13-15, and 39 and accompanying text.
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property regimes have influenced the centrality, scope, and scale of free content 
distribution within creative and information industries. YouTube was established 
as a leading platform for free audio-visual and musical content due in large part 
to the safe harbour for content sharing platforms established by section 512(c) 
of the United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act.51 Instagram owes its 
centrality as a platform for sharing photographs and visual images to the same 
provision.52 Google Books’ legality is based entirely on the US fair use defense.53 
Online music services such as Last.fm54 are able to provide free access to music 
through a technological design that relies on the legality of embedding content 
from other platforms’ content.55 A variety of other content exchange and 
distribution platforms are based on US copyright law’s narrow approach to third 
party liability, including the rule that technological devices capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses are not subjected to contributory liability.56 For example, 
software such as Kodi/XBMC,57 which facilitates free distribution of content 
including copyright-protected content, is immune from copyright infringement 
liability, a fact that ensures its widespread use.
By making these observations, I am not arguing that such legal policies 
may not be justified on their particular merits.58 I do argue, however, that such 
legal policies, taken together, contributed to the emergence of a new cultural 
ecosystem in which commercial and profit-motivated corporate media entities 
cluster around and build upon the free distribution of content.
51. See Viacom, supra note 41; See also Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra 
note 14 at 863-67.
52. Instagram, “How do I report a claim of copyright infringement?”, online: <www.help.
instagram.com/277982542336146?ref=related> (Instagram also claims to function as a 
content-sharing platform, which shelters it under section 512(c) of the DMCA).
53. The Authors Guild Inc v Google Inc, 804 F 3d 202 (2015).
54. Last.fm, “Hello & Welcome to Last.fm.”, online: <www.last.fm>.
55. See Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F 3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir 2007); Perfect 10, 
Inc v Google Inc, No CV 04-9484, 2010 WL 9479060 at 1 (CD Cal 2010), 653 F 3d 
976 (9th Cir 2011) (in which it was determined that the embedding of content from 
other websites through techniques such as framing and inline linking does not amount to 
copyright infringement).
56. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. Kodi, <www.kodi.tv/download>. Kodi, formerly known as XBMC, is an open source 
(GPL) software media center for playing videos, music, pictures, games, and more. 
As a technology which is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, the distribution of Kodi 
is not exposed to indirect liability for copyright infringement. Kodi, however, works on 
“AddOns,” which utilize Kodi’s interface to provide access to a variety of content, including 
copyright-protected materials.
58. Supra note 41; supra note 42; supra note 43.
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The traditional corporate media model was based on a producer-consumer 
relationship and the copyrighting of culture—that is, the commodification of 
content—through proprietary protection.59 Extracting direct revenue from the 
distribution of, and provision of access to, content was the crux of the traditional 
economic model.60 This traditional model is now being partially replaced by a 
new business model that relies upon free access and free distribution of content. 
This new business model is based mostly on revenue extracted from the sale of 
advertisements and users’ personal data.61 The strategic business goal of maximizing 
clicks, repeat visits, and time spent visiting particular websites is intertwined 
with the goal of maximizing the effectiveness of advertising, including sponsored 
content and stealth marketing.62 Optimized commercialization and utilization of 
mass-aggregated personal information is another fundamental building block of 
the networked economy.63
Communicative spheres of free content thus represent a social contradiction 
between their empowering functions and their vulnerability to exploitation and 
commodification. Free flow and distribution of content undoubtedly stimulate 
social conditions that empower individuals, promote innovation and cultural 
democracy, while simultaneously failing to provide safeguards against patterns 
that imitate the logic and driving forces of proprietary cultural industries.64 In fact, 
such social conditions simultaneously create new opportunities for profits and 
property accumulation that are achieved mostly through the commodification 
and commercialization of users’ attention and personal information.
59. See Benkler, “From Consumers to Users”, supra note 4; Pessach, “Copyright as a Silencing 
Restriction”, supra note 2 at 1076-1081, 1087-1092; see also supra note 41-43 and 
accompanying text.
60. See sources cited supra note 7.
61. See Menell, supra note 19 at 805; Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Morozov, supra note 18 
at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 249-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran, Fenton & 
Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84.
62. Ibid; See also Ellen Goodman, “Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity” (2006) 85 Texas 
L Rev 83; Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You (New York: The 
Penguin Press Group, 2001) at 60; Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Adverting 
Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) 
at 88; Ira S Rubinstein, Ronald D Lee & Paul M Schwartz, “Data Mining and Internet 
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75 U Chicago Law 
Rev 261; Ryan Calo, “Digital Market Manipulation” (2014) 82:4 Geo Wash L Rev 995.
63. See Cohen, supra note 19; Pasquale, supra note 22; Strandburg, supra note 23 at 122-32.
64. See supra note 11; supra note 13 and the accompanying text.
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The partial creative destruction65 of traditional corporate media models is 
therefore more complex and challenging than scholarship and public advocacy 
has presumed.66 Contemporary networked media environments are at least to 
some degree a postmodern version of the “Culture Industry” originally analyzed 
by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer with regard to the emergence of 
traditional mass media.67 Adorno and Horkheimer described the emergence of 
industrialized production and distribution of standardized cultural goods by 
mass communications media. According to their analysis, products of the culture 
economy take the appearance of artwork but are in fact dependent on industry 
and economy, meaning they are subjected to the interests of money and power 
and are designed for profit.68 Adorno and Horkheimer further described the 
manner in which the culture industry manipulates mass society by cultivating 
false psychological needs that can only be met and satisfied by the products of 
corporate mass media capitalism while driving people into passivity due to the 
false illusion of democratic cultural participation.69
Networked cultural environments based on free distribution of content tend 
to follow similar patterns. Structures of media dominance established through 
centralized regulatory and proprietary control are now being replaced by elements 
of openness, interactivity and participation.70 This transformation is not just a 
shift in the structure and economy of creative industries. It is also a symbolic 
ideological process that confronts the perils of the old corporate media model with 
65. Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc, 1942) at 81-85 (arguing that ordinary competition between similar 
competitors with slightly differentiated products is not the source of much consumer benefit. 
Rather, monopoly and oligopoly are undercut by the emergence of “the new commodity, the 
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization” that “strikes [at]…
the existing firms[’]…foundations and their very lives.” This process, which Schumpeter calls 
“creative destruction,” “expands output and brings down prices”).
66. See supra notes 1-4, 7-8, and 10, and the accompanying text.
67. Theodor W Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by 
Edmund Jephcott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) at 94.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid; See also Bill Ryan, Making Capital From Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist 
Cultural Production (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991) at 184; Iain Chambers, Popular 
Culture: The Metropolitan Experience (New York: Routledge, 1986); John Fiske, Reading the 
Popular (New York: Routledge, 2010); John Fiske, Television Culture (New York: Routledge, 
2010); Andrew Ross, No Respect for Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 1989) (developing 
Adorno & Horkheimer’s approach).
70. See e.g. Balkin, supra note 11; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11.
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the prospects of digitization and networked communication platforms.71 At the 
same time, however, the open, accessible, interactive and participatory Internet 
is a platform for industrialized production and distribution of standardized 
informational goods capable of generating and commercializing traffic, users’ 
attention, and personal information. Such informational goods appear to be the 
products of a free digital culture, but many of them are in fact subjected to the 
interests of money and power.72
Like the cultural industry, networked informational capitalism also generates 
false illusions of democratic cultural participation. Behind the veil of free flow 
are categorical limits to the capacities of content and information as shared 
resources, even for those who contribute to their production. Individuals’ 
content and information may be “free as the air” to common use,73 but as 
Jeron Lanier demonstrates, the proceeds of aggregating and analyzing peoples’ 
interactions with such content and information are de facto propertized without 
transparency.74 In many circumstances, individuals who create free content lack 
access to the data essential to reach tailored audiences, distribute their content 
effectively, determine pricing schemes, or even identify the recipients of their 
speech activities. In Lanier’s language, these are all privileges to which only a 
handful of siren servers’ operators are entitled.75
The resemblance between Adorno and Horkheimer’s framing of “the 
culture industry as mass deception”76 and contemporary networked media 
environments has two elements: (a) the prominence of industrialized production 
and distribution platforms; and (b) false illusions regarding people’s cultural 
capacities as both creators and recipients. By making this argument, I do not 
attempt to undermine the fundamental positive transformation that the Internet 
and digital technologies have brought in terms of empowering people’s capacities 
as creators and recipients of creative content. I do argue, however, that many 
of these individual, autonomous engagements are simultaneously exploited 
71. See e.g. McChesney, supra note 18 at 109; Matteo Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture 
and the Grammar of Sabotage” in Daniel Araya & Michael A Peters, eds, Education in 
the Creative Economy: Knowledge and Learning in the Age of Innovation (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2010) 285; Christian Fuchs, “Information and Communication Technologies and 
Society: A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy of the Internet” (2009) 
24:1 Eur J Comm 69.
72. See Lanier, supra note 18; Morozov, supra note 18 at 63; Taylor, supra note 18 at 197, 217.
73. Benkler, supra note 1.
74. Supra note 18 at 48, 113.
75. Ibid at 63.
76. Adormo & Horkheimer, supra note 67 at 94.
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by large-scale, profit-motivated corporate networked industries that leverage 
free content environments as opportunities for profit and as their means of 
production.77 These industries also use frames and concepts of “free culture” 
and “openness” in order to disguise both their goals and the consequences of 
their activities.78
One method of further understanding the effects of contemporary 
networked media environments is by evaluating them according to the same 
parameters under which the political economy of traditional corporate media has 
been critically examined,79 including media concentration and barriers to entry; 
content diversity and the nature and characteristics of the media products being 
produced; and such basic values as privacy, personal autonomy, free speech and 
distributive values.
A critical evaluation of networked free content distribution platforms reveals 
that these platforms overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional 
corporate media model in a variety of ways. Amateur and user-generated 
content,80 collaborative media, and commons-based peer production81 are just a 
few examples of the manner in which networked free information and content 
platforms diversify cultural production and empower bottom-up individual 
and civically-engaged creative engagements.82 At the same time, however, the 
drawbacks associated with contemporary networked media environments 
parallel, and to some degree even exceed, those associated with the traditional 
corporate media model.
In terms of media concentration and barriers of entry, the networked 
environment is highly concentrated: Google controls around 70 per cent of 
search services,83 YouTube controls around 70 per cent of online video clips & 
music video services,84 and Facebook accounts for more than 50 per cent of social 
77. See also Jason Lanier, You Are Not A Gadget (New York: Vintage Books, 2011) at 76.
78. See supra note 71; supra note 72.
79. See generally Baker, “Media, Markets, and Democracy”, supra note 8; Guy Pessach, “Media, 
Markets, and Democracy: Revisiting an Eternal Triangle, Critical Notice: Media, Markets 
and Democracy” (2004) Can JL & Jur 209 at 210-15 [Pessach, “Media, Markets and 
Democracy, Critical Notice”].
80. See e.g. Chander & Sunder, supra note 15; Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 15.
81. See e.g. Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin”, supra note 15.
82. See also Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 at 177-224; See also Lessig, “Remix”, supra note 11 at 
177-224; Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11 at 116-27, 212-32, 273-300.
83. See Curran, Fenton & Freedman, supra note 18 at 89. See also Eli M Noam, Media 
Ownership and Concentration in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 
273-94, 424-25.
84. Ibid.
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networking traffic.85 This highly concentrated environment is partially explained 
by network effects that give an advantage to large-scale intermediaries.86 It also 
results from the centrality of advertisement revenue as a source of income in a 
networked environment. The bigger the platform, the better it is for generating 
advertising revenue. Advertisers looking for content, data brokers looking for 
information, content distributors looking for audiences, and audiences looking 
for content are driven back to familiar platforms, which thus procure, maintain, 
and increase market dominance.87
A second parameter under which the political economy of the traditional 
corporate media model has been critically examined is content diversity and 
the characteristics of the media products being produced.88 Here also, a close 
inspection reveals that contemporary networked media environments might 
also undermine content diversity under certain conditions. Market economy 
settings structured around free content incentivize what seems to be an extreme 
version of the traditional “market for eyeballs” and advertisement-supported 
85. Ibid.
86. Albert-laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks (Cambridge, MA: Perseus 
Publishing, 2002) at 73-77; Bernardo A Huberman & Lada A Adamic, “Growth Dyanmics 
of the World-Wide Web” (1999) 401 Nature 131; Lada A Adamic & Bernardo A Huberman, 
“Power-Law Distribution of the World Wide Web” (2000) 287:5461 Science 2115; 
Albert-Laszlo Barabasi & Reka Albert, “Emerging of Scaling in Random Networks” (1999) 
286:5439 Science at 509-12; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) at 132-33 (arguing that network effects, or network externalities, 
are “markets in which the value that consumers place on a good increases as others use the 
good”); Mark A Lemley & David McGowan, “Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects” (1998) 86:3 Cal L Rev 479 (arguing that in the context of information and content 
intermediaries, the more popular the platform is, the more valuable and usable it is to both 
content providers and content consumers).
87. See generally Florence Thepot, “Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: 
A Matter of Two-Sided Markets” (2013) 36:2 Kluwer L Intl 195.
88. See Noam, supra note 83 at 273-94, 424-25; C Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and 
Democracy: Why Ownership Matters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 
93-113 (describing and explaining the tendency toward media concentration in networked 
communication platforms); Lincoln Dahlberg, “The Corporate Colonization of Online 
Attention and the Marginalization of Critical Communication?” (2005) 29 J Comm Inquiry 
160 (describing the colonization and concentration of audience attention in a networked 
environment). See also Anita Elberse, “Should You Invest in the Long Tail?” (2008) 86 Harv 
Bus Rev 88 (arguing, based on online sales data, that the Internet increases the relative power 
of hits); Anindya Ghose & Bin Gu, “Search Costs, Demand Structure and Long Tail in 
Electronic Markets: Theory and Evidence” (2006) NET Institute Working Paper No 06-19, 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=941200> (arguing that the internet is skewed towards 
popular content in terms of search costs).
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content distribution platforms.89 The reason is straightforward: if advertisements 
and user traffic are becoming the sole source of revenue, then information 
and content production must follow a formula that maximizes user traffic and 
audience exposure to advertisements. This, in turn, causes wasteful investment in 
duplicative, homogenous content that is likely to achieve this result. Additionally, 
contemporary networked media environments also impose pressures that weaken 
other competing models of content production and content distribution, 
particularly models based on extracting direct revenue from the sale of content. 
After all, competition against “zero pricing” models is all but impossible. “Free,” 
as a predatory pricing mechanism, leaves limited market share for creative and 
informational works that extract direct revenue from selling content.
The political economy of contemporary networked media environments also 
raises concerns about informational privacy and content diversity. To reiterate, 
contemporary networked media environments are substantially structured 
around industrially commodified utilization of personal information.90 
Networked corporate media entities utilize and trade packets of information 
about consumers for purposes such as targeted advertising, price discrimination, 
and risk management templates that maximize the extraction of surplus from 
consumers.91 This reality, which is usually discussed through the prism of privacy 
concerns,92 also implicates the characteristics and attributes of the media products 
being produced.
The economy of monetizing personal information and predictive big data 
businesses requires communicative and informational products that are suitable 
for and that maximize the collection and utilization of large quantities of valuable 
information, including social networks, content sharing platforms, photo sharing 
applications, and other forms of online engagement. Along with their speech 
and communicative functions, such platforms also function as informational 
89. For an analysis of the traditional corporate media market for consumer attention see 
Baker, “Media Markets and Democracy”, supra note 8 at 24-30, 182-83; Edwin C Baker, 
“Advertising and a Democratic Press” (1992) 140:6 U Pa L Rev 2097 (providing factual 
evidence and analyzing the prominent influence that advertisers have on the content of 
media products within advertisement-supported media entities); Robert McChesney, The 
Political Economy of Global Communication, (London: Pluto Press, 1998) at 19.
90. See Menell, supra note 19 at 805; Cohen, supra note 19 at 1915; Morozov, supra note 18 
at 153-54, 161-63, 258-59, 349-50; Taylor, supra note 18 at 191-213; Curran, Fenton & 
Freedman, supra note 18 at 82-84; Pasquale, supra note 22; Strandburg, supra note 23 at 
122-32; supra note 60.
91. See also Lior Strahilevitz, “Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law” (2013) 126:7 Harv L 
Rev 2011; Cohen, supra note 19.
92. Ibid.
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ecosystems with relatively narrow and repetitive content offerings. People are 
being channelled toward and accustomed to communicative spheres in which 
tracking, analysis, prediction, and marketing are highly efficient and effective.93
Firms are thus disincentivized to invest in content production because they 
are instead able to extract significant revenue from the monetization of users’ 
personal information.94 Incentives to invest in diverse content and cultural 
products are likewise being partially replaced by incentives to invest in virtual 
environments and utilities that attract users’ traffic and personalized information.
The growing centrality of the collection of personalized information as a 
means of production also has a distributive dimension. Free content platforms are 
indeed effective at making information and content shared resources.95 Networked 
platforms are also largely based on an end-to-end design that decentralizes and 
democratizes cultural production and cultural distribution.96 At the same time, 
however, users, content creators, and individuals do not have access to the data 
that are gathered, processed, utilized and commercialized by networked platforms, 
social networks, and search utilities operators even though such data are essential 
in order to reach tailored audiences, effectively distribute content, determine 
pricing schemes, and identify the recipients of speech activities.97 Content and 
information may indeed be free to use.98 Yet the outcomes of aggregating and 
analyzing peoples’ interactions with such content and information are de facto 
propertized by networked corporate entities without transparency as to what data 
are gathered, processed, utilized, and commercialized, and how. This, in turn, 
causes distributive disparities between the effective capacities of networked 
corporate platforms and the effective capacities of individuals to capture 
audience attention.
To summarize my argument so far: contemporary networked media 
environments are increasingly structured around free distribution of content. 
93. Turow, supra note 62; Pariser, supra note 62.
94. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 19 at 1912-1917; Strahilevitz, supra note 91 at 2022-2024; 
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics” (2013) 11 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 239.
95. See Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks” supra note 11; Brett M Frischmann, “Peer-to-Peer 
Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument for Retaining Sony’s Safe 
Harbor for Technologies Capable of Substantial Non-infringing Uses” (2005) 52 J 
Copyright Soc’y USA 329.
96. See Mark A Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era” (2000) 48 UCLA L Rev 925; Barbara van 
Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010).
97. See Tene & Polonetsky supra note 94 at 254-55.
98. Benkler, “Free as the Air”, supra note 1.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL246
In a close inspection, such environments suffer from drawbacks similar to the 
drawbacks of the traditional corporate media proprietary model. Along with 
the costs of intellectual property production, the production and distribution 
of market-based free content might also create a host of disadvantages. Free 
content, therefore, may not be as desirable as the critical copyright scholarship 
had presumed. With these concerns in mind, Part II examines the implications 
of this argument for copyright law policy.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW POLICY
Socio-economic conditions of networked communication platforms catalyzed 
the emergence of free content market-based networked environments.99 Reduced 
costs of producing, distributing, and accessing content and information made 
intellectual property proprietary schemes less dominant.100 At the same time, 
copyright law policy stimulated the emergence and growth of the corporate 
free content model. My purpose in this Part is to examine the role of copyright 
law policy in that regard by using the example of the approach of United States 
copyright law to the liability of content-sharing platforms (e.g., YouTube) for 
copyright infringement.
The US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), enacted in 1998 and 
codified in Title 17, § 512 of the United States Code, includes four main safe 
harbours for Internet service providers.101 Section 512(c) provides a safe harbour 
for network hosts that store “[i]nformation residing on systems or networks at 
[the] direction of users,” including, for example, servers that host users’ websites. 
In this respect, § 512(c) limits service providers’ liability for copyright-infringing 
content posted or hosted at the direction of end users.102
This provision protects those service providers that receive no “financial 
benefit directly attributable to … infringing activity,” where the provider has 
neither the right nor the ability to control the infringing activity and where, 
if properly notified, the service provider suppresses access to the infringing 
content.103 It does not protect service providers with actual or constructive 
knowledge of infringing content who fail to move quickly on their own initiative 
99. See supra note 11, 13-15, 39 and the accompanying text.
100. See Benkler, “The Wealth of Networks”, supra note 11 at 59-127; supra 13-15, 39 and the 
accompanying text.
101. See DMCA, supra note 41.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
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to disable access.104 The legislative history of § 512(c) lists as an example of the 
applicability of the safe harbour “providing server space for a user’s web site, for 
a chatroom, or other forum in which material may be posted at the direction 
of users.”105 Material not covered under § 512(c), on the other hand, includes 
material ‘‘that resides on the system or network operated by or for the service 
provider through its own acts or decisions and not at the direction of a user.”106
A central question arose with the emergence of Web 2.0 and content sharing 
platforms: whether and under what conditions content sharing platforms may be 
sheltered under the safe harbour of § 512(c). Several scholars, including Timothy 
Wu and Lawrence Lessig, argued that § 512(c)’s safe harbour also applies to the 
activity of content sharing platforms and other types of Web 2.0 applications.107 
Lessig pointed out that with the enactment of the DMCA, the safe harbours 
for Internet service providers were part of a quid pro quo for the enactment of 
anti-circumvention prohibitions.108 Copyright owners were given much more 
control over their portfolio of copyrighted works, but Congress simultaneously 
reduced the liability of content intermediaries and service-providers by shifting 
from an opt-in strict liability regime to an opt-out “notice and take down” regime.109
Overall, US courts have followed Lessig’s interpretation. Court rulings vary 
in their nuances, but at the end of the day, the general direction of US courts is 
to confer upon content sharing platforms the benefit of § 512(c)’s safe harbour 
104. Ibid.
105. HR Rep No 105-551(II) (1998) at 53 [House Report 105-551(II)].
106. Ibid.
107. See Lawrence Lessig, “Make Way for Copyright Chaos” The New York Times (18 March 
2007), online <www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18lessig.html>; Tim Wu, “Does 
YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?” Slate (26 October 2006), online: <www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/10/does_youtube_really_have_legal_
problems.html> (reporting that “in 1998, [information residing on systems or networks at 
direction of users in § 512(c)] meant Geocities and AOL user pages. But in 2006, that means 
Blogger, Wikipedia, Flickr, Facebook, MySpace, and, yes, YouTube—all the companies whose 
shtick is ‘user-generated content’”).
108. Lessig, supra note 104.
109. House Report 105-551(II), supra note 102 at 54.
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for hosting services providers.110 This legal regime is indeed beneficial if one 
considers the value of the safe harbour in supporting user-generated content, 
amateur content and new channels of distribution.111 Concurrently, however, 
this legal regime has had other consequences:112 it has effectively immunized the 
costless provision of large repertoires of copyright-protected works in a way that 
has channelled audience attention to a handful of global entities that have now 
obtained a dominant bottleneck market position.113
YouTube is a paradigmatic example in this regard. The unprecedented 
market position that YouTube has managed to obtain is mostly due to § 512(c)’s 
safe harbour regime, which enabled YouTube to host endless amounts of popular 
copyright-protected cultural materials and thus establish market dominance.114 
The growing popularity of the platform was largely based on its ability to 
host entire portfolios of copyright-protected works. These network economic 
realities—specifically the ability to host content without any need to obtain ex 
ante authorization from copyright owners due to the safe harbour’s limited legal 
risk—facilitated the economic and cultural conditions for the current market 
domination of YouTube.115
110. See UMG, supra note 41; Capitol, supra note 41; Io Group, supra note 41; Rasenberger & 
Pepe, supra note 41; Viacom, supra note 41. Viacom is the most prominent case in this regard. 
In it, after five years in the courts, the Second Circuit finalized parameters for applying § 
512(c) in the context of content sharing platforms, such as YouTube, while determining that 
content sharing platforms may benefit from § 512(c)’s safe harbor according to the following 
determinations and parameters: (a) content sharing platforms fall within the definition of 
“service provider” in § 512(c); (b) knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that 
indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement is a prerequisite for the obligation 
to remove and take down infringing materials; (c) “the right and ability to control” infringing 
activity does not require “item-specific” knowledge of infringement, but a general ability to 
remove or block access to materials posted on a service provider’s website does not suffice. 
What is required is some type of “substantial influence on the activities of users,” without 
necessarily acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity; and (d) software functions 
of replication, playback and the related videos feature occur “by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user” within the meaning of 17 USC § 512(c)(1).
111. Supra note 15.
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113. See also Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra note 14 at 862-67.
114. YouTube, “Statistics”, online <www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html>; Alexa, 
“youtube.com Traffic Statistics” (October 2016), online <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/
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Practically, § 512(c)’s safe harbour regime, which only obliges YouTube 
to remove infringing materials ex post facto in response to takedown notices 
from copyright owners, was a protective shield in establishing YouTube’s 
market dominance. It supported rapid growth in the platform’s popularity and 
the immense portfolio of popular copyright-protected content that it hosted. 
Furthermore, legal policy under which the embedding of YouTube’s content in 
third party websites does not amount to copyright infringement further enhanced 
the platform’s popularity and dominant position as a global content repository. 116
With YouTube’s procurement of its dominant market position came an 
increase in bargaining power to leverage a move toward business models based 
on collaboration and revenue sharing with creators and rights holders. Authors, 
creators and rights holders are thus faced with a dominant and highly popular 
intermediary that attracts a significant portion of audience attention and is already 
partially shielded from legal liability for hosting their materials. Under such 
conditions, YouTube has considerable ability to legitimize its content activities on 
its own terms.117 Authors, creators, and performers have very few options other 
than to agree to YouTube’s terms and conditions or risk vanishing from audiences’ 
awareness. These terms and conditions tend to be fixed, non-negotiable for most 
contributors, and based on one unilateral business model of free content and 
monetization only through advertising revenue.118
YouTube is a good example of a free content corporate market model. 
Formally, it operates within the boundaries of copyright law. Practically, 
however, with the backing of § 512(c)’s safe harbour regime, it establishes 
market mechanisms based upon monetization through free distribution of 
copyright-protected content. The entire playing field of free content distribution 
is built upon this premise, which also influences the conduct, expectations, 
and preferences of its repeat participants, including the platform itself, content 
contributors, users, ancillary intermediaries (through content embedding), 
advertisers, data brokers, and marketers.
The YouTube model also demonstrates the complex and contradictory 
nature of free content market mechanisms. There are many positive spillovers 
in such an environment, which functions as a commons infrastructure affecting 
peoples’ capacities, both as speakers and as recipients, to access, distribute, and 
utilize creative and informational content. The YouTube model also demonstrates 
the negative dynamics of contemporary networked media environments, 
116. Supra note 42; supra note 55.
117. See Pessach, “Deconstructing Disintermediation”, supra note 14 at 844-54, 862-67.
118. Ibid.
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including: unilaterally-coded boilerplate compensation schemes that undermine 
contributors’ welfare while relying solely on advertising revenue;119 pressure toward 
ruinous competition to manufacture blockbuster hits that generate popularity 
and audience attention;120 an extremely concentrated distribution layer;121 intense 
convergence between product placement, brand marketing, stealth advertisement 
and creative content;122 and limited investment in content production along with 
targeted delivery of content based on personal data collection.123
Given the immeasurable amount of content freely available through 
YouTube, it may seem counterintuitive to question the platform’s vitality 
and social contribution. Yet, upon closer inspection, there is a distinction 
between YouTube’s function as a repository for past materials124 and its ex ante 
content production and distribution functions. Along with its contribution to 
bottom-up, decentralized cultural exchange, there are limits to YouTube’s cultural 
production function. YouTube demonstrates that contemporary networked 
media environments, which are based on limited exposure to copyright liability, 
provide no guarantee against restrictive contractual and technological terms 
imposed on the platform’s users and contributors, including restrictions that 
override copyright exemptions.125
Altogether, this amounts to a cycle in which a content-sharing platform 
such as YouTube advocates and advances limited copyright liability while at the 
same time utilizing its leveraged centrality and market power to impose rules 
and practices that limit the powers and capacities of third party contributors 
and users. A copyright law policy that supports a broad safe harbour for content 
sharing platforms results, therefore, in mixed outcomes. It induces bottom-up 
decentralized users’ contribution. Yet, it also supports and advances the interests 
of networked corporate media entities that rely upon a business model of free 
content distribution.
119. Ibid at 844-54.
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III. CONCLUSION
Critical copyright scholarship over the past two decades has largely focused on 
the social costs of proprietary copyright protection and of the legal ordering 
of cultural production through intellectual property regimes. Along with its 
criticism of intellectual property protection, critical copyright scholarship has 
also celebrated the virtues of free content and free access, particularly in digital 
domains. My purpose in this article was to question this conventional wisdom, 
which tends to pair proprietary intellectual property protection with informational 
capitalism and the commodification of culture. Similar drawbacks are apparent 
also in the context of market-oriented realms based on free distribution of 
content. Media environments that are based on free distribution of content are 
no less vulnerable to corporate market powers. This analysis bears significant 
normative implications on the desirability of contemporary approaches, which 
support mobilization toward non-proprietary legal regimes beyond IP.

